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Abstract: 
 
Behavioral finance studies the application of psychology to finance, with a focus on individual-
level cognitive biases. I describe here the sources of judgment and decision biases, how they 
affect trading and market prices, the role of arbitrage and flows of wealth between more 
rational and less rational investors, how firms exploit inefficient prices and incite misvaluation, 
and the effects of managerial judgment biases. There is need for more theory and testing of the 
effects of feelings on financial decisions and aggregate outcomes. Especially, the time has come 
to move beyond behavioral finance to social finance, which studies the structure of social 
interactions, how financial ideas spread and evolve, and how social processes affect financial 
outcomes.   
I thank Nicholas Barberis, James Choi, Bing Han, Gilles Hilary, Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Danling 
Jiang, Sonya Lim, Siew Hong Teoh, Anjan Thakor, Ivo Welch, Wei Xiong, and Liyan Yang for 
helpful comments, and Lin Sun and Qiguang Wang for excellent research assistance and 
comments. 
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1. Introduction 
The stock price of EntreMed jumped about 600% in one weekend upon the 
republication of information that was already publicly available five months earlier about a new 
cancer drug (Huberman & Regev (2001)). This violated the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which 
asserts that prices accurately reflect publicly available information. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis is based on the idea that most, or at least the most important, investors are rational 
in processing information. Behavioral finance, in contrast, studies how people fall short of this 
ideal in their decisions, and how markets are, to some degree, inefficient.  
The rise of behavioral finance over the last three decades has been felt throughout 
finance and economics. Many scholars are now ready to entertain the consequences of either 
rational or irrational aspects of human judgment, as relevant for the particular application at 
hand. This readiness is greatest for errors by individual market participants; vigorous debate 
continues about how psychological bias affects price determination in large and liquid markets. 
Nevertheless, a modern understanding of the finance field requires grounding in psychological 
as well as rational approaches. Today many of the leading theories about such fundamental 
topics as investor behavior, the cross-section of returns, corporate investment, and money 
management, derive from psychological factors. 
Psychology has identified various judgment biases that can affect financial decision-
making. Since psychological bias is the distinctive feature of behavioral finance, I organize this 
review by the type of bias (see also Shiller (1999)). Also, rather than viewing the psychology of 
judgment and decisions as a congeries of inexplicable facts, I organize the discussion of biases 
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around a relatively small number of underlying evolutionary and psychological roots. Then, I 
discuss financial theories founded upon each type of bias, and the evidence bearing upon them.  
Some fundamentals of behavioral finance do not inherently depend on the specific 
psychological source of bias. So I discuss separately the topics of how arbitrage and flows of 
wealth promote market efficiency, how firms induce or react to mispricing, and how investor 
sentiment affects security markets. 
The main focus of this review is on the effects, individual or aggregate, of individual-
level bias. The topic of social processes, discussed in the conclusion, deserve greater attention 
in finance, and a separate review. Also, I do not go deeply here into distinguishing the effects of 
psychological bias from rational risk effects (see, e.g., the review of Daniel et al. (2002)). 
Some surveys focus more heavily on issues that cut across different psychological 
biases, such as limits to arbitrage (Gromb & Vayanos (2010)), noise trading (Shleifer (2000)), 
and how valuations affect corporate behavior (Baker (2009)). For a greater focus on prospect 
theory, see the excellent survey of Barberis & Thaler (2003); neurofinance, Bernheim (2009); 
experimental economics and asset markets, Smith (2008); investments and asset pricing, 
Hirshleifer (2001); behavioral corporate finance, Baker & Wurgler (2012); behavioral 
accounting, Libby et al. (2002) and Hirshleifer & Teoh (2009a); and policy, regulation, or field 
experiments, Thaler & Sunstein (2008), Hirshleifer (2008), and Card et al. (2011). 
2. Market mispricing, arbitrage, and financial agents 
a. Arbitrage 
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Arbitrage is the purchase or sale of goods to profit from differences in effective prices 
across trading venues. The term is used broadly to refer to the exploitation of profit 
opportunities whenever some assets are overpriced relative to others, based on the idea that 
buying cheap assets and selling similar but expensive ones can yield a relatively low-risk return. 
In perfect markets, arbitrage opportunities are limited by the risk aversion of investors and the 
riskiness of trading the mispriced asset (DeLong et al. (1991)). 
An oft-neglected fact is that arbitrage is a double-edged blade that can make prices 
either more or less efficient. In asset market equilibrium under disagreement, price reflects a 
weighted average of beliefs. So both the irrational impellers of mispricing and the more rational 
correctors of it believe that they are performing profitable arbitrage against inefficient market 
prices. Whether greater arbitrage capital reduces mispricing therefore depends on whether this 
capital is wielded by `smart’ investors—those who are both rational and, if money managers, 
not pandering to the mistaken beliefs of irrational investors about what is a profit opportunity. 
A powerful argument for why markets are often highly efficient is that in the long run 
wealth tends to flow to smart arbitrageurs, who end up dominating the market. However, 
irrational investors can earn higher expected profits than rational ones by bearing higher risk 
(DeLong et al. (1991)), or by inducing self-validating feedback into fundamentals (Hirshleifer et 
al. (2006)). Alternatively, rationality can falter if investing success increases subsequent bias 
(Daniel et al. (1998); Gervais & Odean (2001)). 
If wealth does flow to smart investors, their influence on prices increases, owing either 
to credit constraints or decreasing risk aversion. However, this process is often slow, as strategy 
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performance is typically a very noisy indicator of ability (Yan (2008)). Meanwhile, new naïve 
money flows into markets each day; the succession of generations reshuffles wealth and talent.  
If irrational investors misvalue the idiosyncratic components of the fundamental payoffs 
of many securities, if markets are frictionless, and if rational and irrational investors all bet on 
many securities, then owing to the large number of bets, the flow of wealth becomes swift and 
almost sure. This causes rational investors to acquire all the wealth very quickly. However, if 
most investors only place active bets on subsets of securities, the rate of wealth flow can be 
modest, accommodating relatively substantial and persistent mispricing (Daniel et al. (2001)).       
b. Financial agents 
It is usually supposed that institutional money managers and professional investment 
advisors are smart arbitrageurs, acting on behalf of less sophisticated individual investors. 
Sophisticated investors perform careful analysis to learn about biases of investors or 
consequent mispricing, and the insight derived thereby can be used to educate clients or to 
deploy client funds to achieve high returns. However, owing to conflict of interest, or to 
imperfect rationality of investment professionals, employing agents is an imperfect remedy for 
ignorance and folly.  Money managers often pander to investor irrationality, in order to attract 
inflows. 
This does not make financial advice and delegation pure evils. For example, in the model 
of Gennaioli et al. (2014), `money doctors’ skim off some of the gains from investment, but still 
increase welfare by encouraging otherwise-distrustful individuals to participate in the market.  
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As for whether the ability of irrational investors to hire exploitive agents improves the 
efficiency of prices, there is no general unambiguous answer. So optimism about the 
inevitability of reaching almost perfect market efficiency must be tempered by recognition that 
agents may exacerbate investor bias. Furthermore, when, by chance, mispricing gets worse, 
smart arbs lose money on their existing positions and have more trouble raising funds. So 
corrective arbitrage pressure on price is weakest when it is needed the most (Shleifer & Vishny 
(1997)).            
Owing to heavier total pressure from irrational investors speculating about systematic 
factors, we typically expect greater mispricing of factors than of idiosyncratic payoff 
components, except for idiosyncratic opportunities that arbs simply do not notice (Daniel et al. 
(2001)). For example, the book-to-market and accrual characteristics are associated with return 
comovement (Fama & French (1993); Hirshleifer et al. (2012)), so if the value and accrual 
anomalies (both discussed later) represent mispricing, they are probably relatively hard to 
arbitrage away.     
3. Psychological foundations 
Since people need to make judgments and decisions quickly using limited cognitive 
resources, they necessarily use shortcuts (Simon (1956); Kahneman et al. (1982)), often called 
“heuristics.” All thinking builds upon cognitive algorithms that operate automatically below the 
level of consciousness. The term “heuristics” encompasses both innate and automatic 
processes, and learned or consciously selected rules of thumb. 
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Heuristics often work well within some domains and for some types of problems, but 
badly in others. Heuristic simplification implies more errors for decision problems that range 
farther from the types of problems that the human mind evolved to deal with in the ancestral 
past. 
In dual process theories of cognition, an automatic, non-deliberative system quickly 
generates perceptions and judgments; a slower, more effortful system monitors and revises 
such judgments as time and circumstances permit (Stanovich (1999); Kahneman (2011)). 
Following Haidt and Kesebir (2010), I refer to the fast process as the intuitive system, and the 
slow process as the reasoning system. 
Kahneman (2011) describes human thinking as largely intuitive, and heavily influenced 
by the associations that are triggered by the presentation of a decision problem. People are 
overconfident that their intuitive way of thinking about a problem is correct; information that 
does not immediately come to mind tends to be completely neglected, a phenomenon that 
Kahneman calls WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is).    
Feelings provide the value weights assigned to possible outcomes to motivate decisions 
and actions. Affective reactions can also facilitate making fast use of urgent information about 
the environment (as in the affect heuristic; Slovic et al. (2002)). For example, a risky investment 
opportunity may trigger fear and, thereby, useful hesitation. 
However, feelings often short-circuit useful analysis, as with exiting the stock market in 
sudden panic, or buying a hot stock based on enthusiasm rather than critical evaluation. Such 
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affective short-circuiting can also create self-discipline problems, such as not saving for 
retirement.  
In modern financial markets, there are great benefits to making decisions analytically 
rather than relying solely upon feelings and intuition. Intuition-generating mechanisms suited 
to the human ancestral environment provide poor guidance for decisions in modern markets 
and large economies.   
Beliefs have a social-signaling as well as a decision-making role. In the theory of Trivers 
(1991), people overestimate their personal merits so as to be more persuasive to others about 
them. Such self-deception comes at the cost of errors deriving from overconfident beliefs.   
The three abovementioned elements—heuristic simplification, affective short-circuiting, 
and self-deception—explain most of the psychological biases studied in behavioral finance. 
These elements also underlie the dynamic psychological updating processes that maintain 
biases despite having opportunities to learn from past errors.    
4. Overconfidence and self-esteem maintenance 
a. Psychology of overconfidence 
An immediate consequence of self-deception is that people will be overconfident about 
their merits of various sorts. In overprecision, people think that their judgments are more 
accurate than they really are. Overconfidence tends to be stronger when correct judgments are 
hard to form, such as when uncertainty is high. The difficulty effect is the finding that 
overprecision is stronger for challenging judgment tasks.     
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Recent studies both of overplacement (overestimation of one’s rank in the population) 
in the psychological laboratory (Benoit et al. (2014)) and the field (Merkle & Weber (2011)), and 
of overprecision in financial field settings, confirm that overconfidence is very strong (Ben-
David et al. (2013)).   
Since high ability contributes to good outcomes, overestimation of one’s merits 
promotes overoptimism about one’s prospects. People do tend to be overoptimistic about their 
life prospects (Weinstein (1980)), which affects their economic and financial decisions (Puri & 
Robinson (2007)). 
If overconfidence is to persist as new information about ability arrives, there must be 
biases in updating processes that favor a positive self-assessment. Such self-enhancing 
attribution bias is well documented (Langer & Roth (1975)).    
People tend to shift their attitudes in favor of actions they have chosen or have been 
induced to engage in without compensation, a phenomenon that motivates the theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith (1959)). Such shifts help people reconcile their past 
choices with the perception that they are good decision-makers. Self-enhancing updating 
promotes escalation of commitment (sticking too stubbornly to a choice despite opposing 
information, Staw (1976)), including the sunk cost effect (reluctance to terminate costly 
activities after expending resources on them; Thaler (1980)); and rationalization of one’s past 
behaviors (Nisbett & Wilson (1977)).  
b. Investor overconfidence and self-esteem maintenance 
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i. Overconfidence and trading aggressiveness in static settings 
Overconfidence causes investors to trade more aggressively, which tends to reduce 
their welfare (Odean (1998)). Overconfidence therefore helps solve the active investing puzzle: 
that individual investors trade individual stocks despite losing money doing so (Barber & Odean 
(2000)), and invest in active funds instead of indexing to obtain better net performance. 
Consistent with overconfidence, in experimental markets, some investors overestimate the 
precision of their signals, are more subject to the winner’s curse, and do worse in trading (Biais 
et al. (2005)). 
By promoting bets on individual securities, overconfidence reduces diversification. 
However, as discussed later, underdiversification has other sources as well. So greater 
confidence, by encouraging participation in otherwise-neglected asset classes, can also 
promote diversification.  Indeed, greater feeling of competence about investing is associated 
with weaker home bias in investing (discussed later; Graham et al. (2009)). 
ii. Overconfidence and price overreaction in static settings 
Overconfidence about some value-relevant information signal causes overreaction in 
prices, and therefore long-run correction (Odean (1998)). This implies negative return 
autocorrelations.  
Any psychological force that causes overreaction to information will tend to make high 
price be a proxy for overvaluation and low price for undervaluation. This leads naturally to the 
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size (market value) effect. For example, overextrapolation of fundamentals or prices can cause 
such effects (Lakonishok et al. (1994)).  
Scaling by a proxy for fundamentals, such as book value, cleanses market price of 
variation not derived from mispricing. So in the overconfidence-based capital asset pricing 
model of Daniel et al. (2001), fundamental-to-price ratios predict returns even more strongly, if 
the fundamental proxy is not too noisy. Both beta and scaled price variables such as book-to-
market predict returns. Since scaled price variables capture both risk and mispricing effects, 
they can sometimes dominate beta in return prediction regressions even when risk is priced. 
Empirically, high beta-stocks do underperform (Frazzini & Pedersen (2014)). 
Book-to-market is an example of how mispricing can be proxied by the deviation of 
market price from a benchmark that is less subject to misvaluation. Empirically, stocks with low 
price relative to fundamental proxies on average experience high subsequent returns. Such 
proxies include book value, earnings or cash flow (the value effect), past price (the winner/loser 
effect), or a constant (the size effect).  The value effect has been confirmed in many markets 
and asset classes (Asness et al. (2013)).          
Short-term interest rates can act as a fundamental scaling for long-term rates. So 
overconfidence further implies that the forward premium for bonds denominated in different 
currencies can negatively predict exchange rate shifts, the forward premium puzzle (Burnside et 
al. (2011)). 
Further implications of overconfidence derive from comparative statics on its 
determinants. For example, the difficulty effect implies stronger overconfidence effects for 
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hard-to-value stocks. Consistent with this, the value effect is stronger among high R&D stocks 
(Chan et al. (2001)); momentum is also stronger for hard-to-evaluate stocks (as indicated by 
uncertainty proxies; Jiang et al. (2005)).  
iii. Bias in self-attribution and trading aggressiveness in dynamic settings 
In models of the dynamics of overconfidence, profits on an investor’s existing long or 
short position increase confidence, resulting in greater subsequent trading aggressiveness 
(Daniel et al. (1998)). It follows that for securities that are in positive net supply, high past 
returns should be associated with greater subsequent trading (Gervais & Odean (2001)). 
Consistent with bias in self-attribution, trading activity by individual investors increases 
after they experience high returns (Barber & Odean (2002)). Similarly, investor trading and 
market trading volume increase after high returns (Statman et al. (2006); Griffin et al. (2007)).  
iv. Overconfidence, biased self-attribution, and price under- vs. over-reactions  
Bias in self-attribution implies short-run continuation of stock returns and long-run 
reversal. When a stock has risen, for example, relative to other stocks, in the short run this 
overreaction tends to continue; and, on average, it later falls, but this correction is hindered, so 
the decline also tends to continue.  So short-run return continuation and long-run reversal 
together are consistent with a process of continuing overreaction and then correction (Daniel 
et al. (1998)). This model also implies post-event return continuation (post-event abnormal 
returns of the same sign on average as the event-date reaction) if firms tend to select good 
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news actions in response to underpricing (as with issuing overpriced shares and repurchasing 
underpriced shares); and continuation after earnings surprises.   
Empirically, a contrasting pair of stylized facts is the tendency of stock returns to 
continue in the short run (positive autocorrelations with conditioning period of several months-
- Jegadeesh & Titman (1993)) versus a tendency to reverse in the long run (negative 
autocorrelations with a conditioning period of several years; DeBondt & Thaler (1985)). The 
short-run effect is called momentum, which is present in many asset classes in the time series 
(Moskowitz et al. (2012)) and the cross-section. The long-run reversal of returns is called the 
winner/loser effect. 
Event studies typically report post-event return continuation, i.e., average post-event 
abnormal returns of the same sign as the event-date reaction, as summarized in Hirshleifer 
(2001). For example, seasoned equity issues (and IPOs, and debt issues) tend to be followed by 
negative abnormal returns (the new issues puzzle; Loughran & Ritter (1995); Spiess & Affleck-
Graves (1995)), and repurchase by high returns (Ikenberry et al. (1995)). 
Equity issuance is followed by low average market returns in many countries 
(Henderson et al. (2006)). At the aggregate level as well, the share of equity issues in total new 
equity and debt issues has been a negative predictor of U.S. market returns (Baker & Wurgler 
(2000)). 
Also consistent with overconfidence and bias in self-attribution, earnings surprises are 
associated with subsequent abnormal returns of the same sign (post-earnings announcement 
drift, discussed in Section 5).  
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The ability of overconfidence and its dynamic counterpart, self-attribution bias, to 
explain a wide range of major patterns of return predictability is notable, but does not prove 
that overconfidence is the cause. Indeed, later sections discuss alternative possible 
psychological explanations for several of these effects. Distinguishing theories requires homing 
in on their distinctive implications. 
v. Overconfidence, short-sales constraints, and overpricing 
In the model of Miller (1977), owing to short-sale constraints, only relatively optimistic 
beliefs are impounded into price, resulting in overvaluation. Investors stubbornly disagree, 
although rationally optimists should update pessimistically based on the knowledge that there 
are sidelined pessimists. Such disagreement can be explained by overconfidence on the part of 
optimists that their own analysis is superior, or that disagreeing investors are rare (as in 
WYSIATI).   
Empirically, dispersion of analyst forecasts is negatively associated with subsequent 
abnormal returns (Diether et al. (2002)). Clear examples of overpricing derived from 
disagreement and short-selling constraints occurred during the millennial high-tech boom, 
when the market value of a parent firm was sometimes substantially less than the value of its 
holdings in one of its publicly-traded divisions (Lamont & Thaler (2003)). Also consistent with 
the Miller theory, stocks with tighter short-sale constraints have stronger return predictability 
anomalies (Nagel (2005)), and greater long-short asymmetry in the accrual anomaly (Hirshleifer 
et al. (2011)).  
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Volatility increases the scope for disagreement, implying greater overvaluation. 
Empirically, stocks with high idiosyncratic risk (Ang et al. (2006)) do underperform.  
In markets with short sale constraints, investors may buy overvalued stocks in the 
expectation of selling at an even higher price to overconfident investors. Lower available float 
should exacerbate such bubbles (Hong et al. (2006)), as confirmed for a bubble in Chinese 
warrants (Xiong & Yu (2011)).  
c. Managerial and advisor overconfidence and overoptimism 
A manager who is overconfident of his ability will tend to be optimistic about his firm’s 
prospects as well. In the model of Bernardo & Welch (2001), overconfidence has a bright side, 
as it encourages entrepreneurs to engage in socially desirable experimentation. Survey 
evidence confirms that entrepreneurs tend to be overoptimistic about their future success. 
Overconfidence and overoptimism have obvious costs, but can also help shareholders 
by encouraging risk averse managers to take good risky or innovative projects (Campbell et al. 
(2011)). This leads to a benefit to matching managerial optimism or confidence appropriately to 
firms (Goel & Thakor (2008)). Different degrees of optimism between entrepreneurs and 
outside investors can result in inefficient screening of projects, creating a role for rational banks 
to act as a bridge between these two groups (Coval & Thakor (2005). 
i. Evidence on overconfidence, optimism, and investment and financing 
decisions 
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Several strands of evidence display both the bright and dark sides of managerial 
overconfidence and overoptimism suggested by theoretical models. On the dark side, bidders 
on average earn low returns from takeovers, more optimistic managers are more likely to make 
acquisitions, and the market reacts more negatively to their bids (Malmendier & Tate (2008)).  
Optimistic CEOs also use less external finance, especially equity (Malmendier et al. 
(2011)), and finance relatively more with short-term debt (Graham et al. (2013)). The 
investment of firms with overoptimistic managers (as proxied by voluntarily retaining equity-
like claims in the firm), is more sensitive to cash flow (Malmendier & Tate (2005)). This suggests 
that such managers view their firm as undervalued, making external capital seem expensive to 
them. 
Both overconfidence and overoptimism are associated with greater corporate 
investment (Ben-David et al. (2013)). Potentially on the bright side, overoptimistic managers 
spend more on R&D, and obtain more patents relative to their R&D spending, perhaps because 
of greater willingness to bear risk (Hirshleifer et al. (2012)). 
The optimism of analyst forecasts at long horizons suggests either that analysts are 
overoptimistic, or that they forecast optimistically for agency reasons (Richardson et al. (2004)). 
The association of analyst political attitudes with forecast optimism suggests that psychological 
factors play a role (Jiang et al. (2014)). 
ii. Dynamics of managerial and analyst confidence 
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Turning to the dynamics of managerial bias, there is evidence suggesting that managers 
tend to attribute good performance excessively to their own abilities rather than luck. Bias in 
managerial self-attribution has been found in the contexts of repeated acquisitions (Billett & 
Qian (2008)) and in the issuance of management earnings forecasts after past successes (Hilary 
& Hsu (2011)).  
5. Limited attention and cognitive processing 
Owing to limited attention and processing power, people tend to neglect relevant 
information signals and strategic features of the decision environment. This is manifested in a 
variety of more specific effects to be described, such as evaluation based on categories, the 
influence of framing and reference points on judgments, conceptual discretizing of continuous 
quantities, flawed tracking of costs and benefits in mental accounting, and the heuristic 
updating of beliefs. 
a. Failure to process signals and features of the decision environment 
People tend to neglect low salience signals and overreact to salient or recent news. 
Owing to WYSIATI, they also tend to be unaware of such errors, and hence do often not correct 
them. People also neglect important features of their decision environments, such as strategic 
motives for the actions of others. Such neglect is reflected in cognitive hierarchy models and 
evidence in the experimental game theory literature (Camerer et al. (2004)), and other models 
of neglect of strategic motives (Hirshleifer & Teoh (2003); Eyster & Rabin (2005)).  
i. Financial theories of information neglect     
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Information sources can be biased because of inherent psychological bias, infection by 
public excitement, or conflict of interest. When investors do not adjust appropriately for biased 
signal provision, trading mistakes and mispricing follow (see Section 7.b). 
In the models of Hirshleifer & Teoh (2003), Peng & Xiong (2006), and Hirshleifer et al. 
(2011), a subset of investors neglect a value-relevant information signal, resulting in return 
predictability. Examples of such signals include the deviation between GAAP and pro forma 
earnings, footnotes in financial statements about option compensation to managers, the 
breakdown of earnings between components with different value relevance (cash flows versus 
accruals), and earnings surprises.  
Limited attention theories imply positive abnormal returns after neglected good news 
and negative abnormal returns after neglected bad news. Firms can temporarily increase their 
stock prices through earnings management, and presumably do so when the gains from having 
a high stock price are large. 
For two reasons, limited attention causes overreactions as well as underreactions. First, 
investors overreact to salient news. Second, neglect of earnings components implies 
overreaction to the less predictive component, accruals (Sloan (1996); Hirshleifer et al. (2011)).  
Hong & Stein (1999) study the interaction between “news-watchers” who condition only 
on signals about future cash flows and “momentum traders” who condition only on a partial 
history of prices. The information possessed by news-watchers is gradually incorporated into 
prices, and naïve momentum trading causes trends to overshoot and later correct. This 
generates return under- and overreactions. Momentum is strongest among low-attention 
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stocks owing to slower diffusion of information. Consistent with this prediction, Hong et al. 
(2000) find that momentum is stronger for small stocks and stocks with low analyst coverage.   
ii. Financial evidence on information neglect, salience, and distraction 
A. Investor naiveté 
Many investors are naïve in their financial beliefs, and do not understand basic concepts 
such as equity or diversification (Lusardi & Mitchell (2011)). Notably, there are (short-lived) 
episodes of extreme trading in response to egregious confusions between the abbreviated 
names of firms and the ticker symbols of other firms (Rashes (2001)). Such episodes suggest 
that more subtle confusions are rife. 
B. Evidence of pricing effects of signal neglect and neglect of strategic 
motives 
The introduction gave an example of high influence of salient news announcements. At 
the opposite extreme, there is severe neglect of non-salient information, such as that contained 
in demographic predictors of shifts in product demand (DellaVigna & Pollet (2007)).  
A venerable anomaly is the sluggish reaction of stock prices to earnings surprises and 
revisions in analyst forecasts of earnings, post-earnings announcement drift or PEAD (Foster et 
al. (1984); Bernard & Thomas (1989)). The fact that subsequent returns associated with 
earnings surprises are concentrated at later earnings announcements, and that market 
reactions reflect naïve seasonal random walk expectations, support a limited attention 
explanation. 
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Accruals, the accounting adjustments made to cash flows to obtain earnings, are less 
positive than cash flow as a predictor of profitability.  Neglect of the distinction between these 
earnings components, and of the incentives of managers to manage earnings, cause accruals 
and their abnormal `managed’ component to be negative predictors of returns, the accrual 
anomaly (Sloan (1996); Teoh et al. (1998a,b)). Accruals are also associated with bias in analyst 
forecasts (Teoh & Wong (2002)). 
The accrual anomaly is based on a comparison of two non-parallel quantities, earnings 
and cash flow. The cash analog to earnings is Free Cash Flow, which is net of investment 
expenditures (just as earnings is net of depreciation). So the deviation between cash and 
accounting profitability should be a better indicator than accruals of misvaluation. Cumulating 
the deviations over time yields Net Operating Assets, which turns out to be a much stronger 
return predictor than accruals (Hirshleifer et al. (2004)).  
Salience and distraction, by modulating investor attention, affect trading and mispricing. 
Several data confirm that information that is more salient or easier to process is incorporated 
more sharply into prices. The prices of country funds underreact to changes in the value of 
underlying assets, except when the news appears in the front page of The New York Times 
(Klibanoff et al. (1998)). Industry information is impounded into prices more rapidly in simple 
pure-play firms than in conglomerates that operate across industries (Cohen & Lou (2012)). 
Consistent with high salience of news media coverage and the Miller (1977) 
disagreement model, individual investors are net buyers of stocks that have recently gained 
media attention, as well as stocks with high abnormal trading volume or extreme one-day 
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returns (Barber & Odean (2008)). Suggestive of gradual growth in net demand for stocks that 
have become the focus of investor attention, stocks with unusually high trading volume over a 
day or a week on average earn a return premium during the next month (Gervais et al. (2001)). 
There should generally be greater resort to intuitive, heuristic thinking when an 
investor’s attentional resources are depleted, such as when there is greater decision pressure 
or distracting news. The sensitivity of the market reaction to earnings surprises is weaker on 
Fridays when attention should be low (DellaVigna & Pollet (2009)), and when the number of 
distracting same-day earnings announcements is large (Hirshleifer et al. (2009)), resulting in 
correspondingly larger post-earnings announcement drift. 
b. Neglecting basic features of the decision environment 
Even professionals have cognitive constraints and rely on heuristics. For example, a 
survey of CFOs found use of naïve capital budgeting approaches such as the payback criterion, 
and the use of a single discount rate to evaluate very different kinds of projects (Graham & 
Harvey (2001)).   
In narrow framing (Kahneman & Lovallo (1993)), a decision problem is viewed in 
isolation from some of the factors that are relevant for it. For example, in Choi et al. (2009), 
individuals neglected the employer matching feature of contributions to their retirement plans, 
unless the decision problem was designed to force them to make integrated decisions. Under 
narrow framing, the addition of each asset to a portfolio is evaluated based upon whether it is 
viewed as inherently good or bad instead of in terms of its diversifying contribution to the 
overall portfolio.  
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In fact, people do tend to invest in excessively narrow sets of assets and asset classes. A 
notable stylized fact is that investors tend to eschew foreign securities, home bias (French & 
Poterba (1991); Tesar & Werner (1995)). This effect is stronger for investors with lower 
cognitive abilities and financial literacy (Grinblatt et al. (2011)). Sections 4 and 6 discuss other 
reasons for underdiversification. 
c. Financial theories of category thinking 
Behavioral explanations for comovement involve either irrational amplification of 
fundamental comovement, or other kinds of misperceptions. In the first approach, 
overconfident investors who overreact to information about fundamental factors induce return 
comovement (Daniel et al. (2001)).  
In the model of Hirshleifer & Jiang (2010), a factor portfolio is built by going long and 
short on misvalued firms, and a stock’s factor loading measures the extent to which the firm 
inherits investor overreaction to fundamental factors. Such loadings are therefore proxies for 
firm-level misvaluation. Empirically, there is comovement in stock returns associated with a 
misvaluation factor based upon debt and equity issuance and repurchase; loadings on this 
factor are strong return predictors. 
An alternative explanation for comovement in excess of fundamentals is that investors 
think heuristically about security categories. A basic mechanism of thought is classification, so 
that instances can be evaluated based on features of their categories (see, e.g., Ashby & 
Maddox (2005)). Such a heuristic is powerful, but flawed when categories are non-uniform.  
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In the style investing model of Barberis & Shleifer (2003), assets that share a style 
comove more than would be implied by fundamentals. Shifting the category of an asset raises 
its correlation with its new style.  Owing to style-based trading, style-level momentum and 
value strategies are predicted to be more profitable than their asset-level counterparts. Related 
implications can be derived in a model that focuses explicitly on constraints on investor’s 
attention (Peng & Xiong (2006)).   
Style investing can explain the temporary high returns of stocks upon S&P inclusion 
(Harris & Gurel (1986); Shleifer (1986)), comovement of stocks that share styles such as size and 
book-to-market, and increased comovement of stocks that are added to the S&P 500 with 
existing index members (Barberis et al. (2005)).   
Both overreaction to fundamental factor signals, and style investing, imply comovement 
in excess of what would be expected rationally. Consistent with this implication, presumably-
naïve retail investor trading is associated with return comovement (Kumar & Lee (2006)).  
d. Reference-dependence and framing 
Cognitive processes are to some extent specific to the domain of the decision problem 
(Cosmides & Tooby (2013)), and to the modality of presentation (graphical, numerical, or 
verbal; probabilities versus frequencies; see, e.g., Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995)). Even for given 
type of decision problem and modality, alternative descriptions of logically identical decision 
problems, such as the highlighting of a different reference for comparison of outcomes, have 
large effects on choices, a phenomenon known as framing (Tversky & Kahneman (1981)).  
Optimizing based on deviations of payoffs from reference points (a key feature of prospect 
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theory, discussed later in this section) implies framing effects, and therefore choices that 
become  inconsistent as changing presentations or circumstances cause the reference point to 
shift.    
There is extensive evidence that seemingly irrelevant reference points matter to 
investors and firms. Firms manage earnings to meet salient thresholds (forecasts or past 
earnings; DeGeorge et al. (1999)), and stock prices react sharply to even a small shortfall. Firms’ 
borrowing rates seem unduly influenced by previous rates (Dougal et al. (2014)).  Past stock 
price highs affect firm and investor behavior and predict future stock and market returns 
(George & Hwang (2004); Baker et al. (2012)).  
When individuals do not have an answer to a decision problem, they often substitute 
the solution to a related simpler problem, attribute substitution (Kahneman & Frederick 
(2002)). This can explain money illusion (Fisher (1928)), wherein nominal instead of real prices 
are used for investment decisions. In this spirit, Ritter & Warr (2002) argue that mistaken 
discounting at nominal interest rates induced long U.S. bear and bull markets as inflationary 
trends shifted.  
e. Conceptual discretizing, loss aversion, and probability weighting 
Expected utility theory cannot explain, with plausible levels of aversion to large risks, the 
degree to which people avoid small gambles (Rabin (2000)). This phenomenon, called loss 
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky (1979)), has been modeled as a distaste for gambles whose 
payoffs sometimes fall slightly short of a reference point. This suggests a kink in the value 
function at the reference point (as in prospect theory, discussed later; but see also Gal (2006)). 
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Empirically, loss aversion affects the trading decisions of professional investors (Coval & 
Shumway (2005)). Economists have long strived to understand the high estimated premium of 
equity expected returns over bonds (\citeN{mehra/prescott:85}). By increasing effective risk 
aversion, loss aversion offers a possible explanation for the equity premium and 
nonparticipation puzzles; shifts in loss aversion owing to the house money effect additionally 
can explain high equity return volatility and the value effect in the cross-section of returns 
(Benartzi & Thaler (1995) and Barberis & Huang (2001), but see also Beshears et al. (2012)). The 
equity premium over long-term bond yields has, however, been small for the last four decades 
(Welch & Levi (2013)), which is consistent with this explanation if investors over time have 
started to understand that their loss aversion was excessive. 
Loss aversion may reflect the use of a heuristic of discretizing continuous variables so 
that even a small loss is perceived to be essentially different from a small gain.  I call this 
phenomenon conceptual discretizing.  
Conceptual discretizing can also explain why individuals overweight fairly unlikely events 
yet underweight extremely unlikely ones (treated as “virtually impossible”); such probability 
weighting is a key ingredient of prospect theory. In the model of Barberis & Huang (2008), 
probability weighting induces a demand for positively skewed “lottery stocks.” Alternatively, 
social interactions can induce such a demand even if investors have no direct preference for 
skewness (Han & Hirshleifer (2014)). These approaches can explain the high investor demand 
for, and low future returns experienced by positively skewed stocks (Boyer et al. (2010); Eraker 
& Ready (2014)).   
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f. Mental accounting and realization preference 
Mental accounting is the system that people use to track their gains and losses relative 
to a reference point, and feel rewarded or punished for them. It involves narrow framing, 
wherein people separately optimize different kinds of gains and losses that are placed in 
different mental accounts. Investors reexamine each account intermittently for occasional 
action. Under mental accounting, people care about the labeling of payoffs by account, even 
when completely fungible across accounts, as this affects attribution as a gain or a loss.  
Narrow framing, reference-dependence, loss aversion, and mental accounting are 
efficiently modeled as nontraditional preferences. However, all can be viewed as reflecting 
mistakes of analysis or belief, as with an investor who decides whether to sell a stock by 
focusing on its marginal return distribution without thinking about why he should care about 
covariance with his portfolio. 
i. Realization preference 
If selling a stock makes the incremental payoff in its mental account more salient, 
investors should become more willing to realize as the net gain increases realization preference. 
Under loss aversion, this applies even to small gains and losses, implying a jump at zero, sign 
realization preference. Such behavior can enhance self-esteem, if it is easier to pretend that 
mere “paper” losses will be regained.  
In the model of Grinblatt & Han (2005), a greater willingness to sell above than below 
the purchase price causes price underreaction to news. Empirically this effect helps explain 
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return momentum. However, pure underreaction theories do not explain the evidence that 
momentum reverses in the long-run (Griffin et al. (2003); Jegadeesh & Titman (2011)). 
In a test focusing directly on realizations, Lim (2006) finds that individual investors are 
more likely to sell losers on the same day than winners on the same day. This is consistent with 
the dual risk attitudes of prospect theory (risk loving in the loss domain, risk averse in the gain 
domain) together with realization preference.  
A. The disposition effect 
The disposition effect is the strong and widespread regularity that the probability of an 
investor selling an asset conditional upon a gain is greater than conditional upon a loss (Shefrin 
& Statman (1985)). The disposition effect is often appealed to as strong evidence that 
psychological bias affects trading, yet it is not known what bias causes it. 
Experimental and field evidence reveals a reverse disposition effect (selling losers) for 
delegated holdings in mutual funds. The reversal of the disposition effect when investors can 
assign blame to others suggests that the urge to maintain self-esteem is a key driver of the 
effect (Chang et al. (2014)). 
A direct realization preference explanation for the disposition effect was suggested by 
Shefrin & Statman (1985) and modeled by Barberis & Xiong (2012). Other possible explanations 
derive from the dual risk preference feature of prospect theory; Barberis & Xiong (2009) point 
out limitations of this approach, whereas Henderson (2012) and Li & Yang (2013) describe 
conditions under which the prospect theory explanation can work. 
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There is evidence of neurological processes associated with realization preference 
(Frydman et al. (2014)). However, discontinuity tests on U.S. investor trades do not support sign 
realization preference, and show that it is not the source of the disposition effect. Furthermore, 
the empirical V-shape in probability of both selling and buying as functions of gains or losses 
suggests that realization preference is not the dominant motive for selling decisions in general 
(Ben-David & Hirshleifer (2012)).   
Contrary to common discussions, there is currently no strong empirical indication as to 
whether preference-based models or explicit belief bias models will offer a better explanation 
for the disposition effect. In empirical papers, explanations have typically been discussed in a 
static fashion; recent models derive predictions that reflect the dynamics of trading with 
realization preference (Barberis & Xiong (2012), Ingersoll & Jin (2013)).  
ii. Prospect theory 
Reference dependence and loss aversion are ingredients of prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky (1979); Tversky & Kahneman (1992)), wherein individuals maximize a weighted sum 
across states of the world of value functions (utilities), value depends on gains or losses rather 
than levels, and where the weights are functions of probabilities (in a fashion discussed earlier)
 . Value is an S-shaped function of gain/loss (dual risk attitudes), resulting in risk aversion 
in the gain domain and risk seeking in the loss domain. Loss aversion is reflected in a kink in the 
value function at zero gain or loss. Financial theories and evidence based upon the different 
ingredients of prospect theory were discussed in earlier sections. 
g. Heuristic learning 
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i. Representativeness, hyperactive pattern-recognition, and overextrapolation 
According to the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky (1973)), people 
assess the probability of a state of the world based on how typical of that state the evidence 
seems to be. This is reasonable if typicality proxies for the conditional probability of the 
evidence given the state of the world. However, rationally one should adjust for the prior 
probabilities of the outcomes. In reality people tend to underweight verbal statements about 
unconditional population frequencies in updating beliefs— base-rate underweighting. This is 
another symptom of WYSIATI.  
Furthermore, perceptions of how typical a piece of evidence is of a state of the world 
often reflect its conditional probability poorly. For example, error management theory holds 
that the human mind evolved to overweight the probabilities of opportunities or dangers when 
the potential cost of neglect is high (Haselton & Nettle (2006)). This suggests that people are 
subject to what may be called hyperactive pattern recognition. For example, people tend to 
overweight small samples in drawing inferences about distributions (the law of small numbers, 
Tversky & Kahneman (1971)). However, they also rely too little on large samples.  
In financial markets, overextrapolation of security returns implies positive feedback 
trading. In the model of DeLong et al. (1990b), exogenous positive feedback trading causes 
overreaction and long-run return reversal, and potentially short-run momentum as well. 
In the model of Barberis et al. (1998), conservatism bias (Edwards (1968)), in which 
individuals hold too tightly to estimates based upon early observations, causes short-term 
underreaction to earnings news (consistent with the PEAD anomaly). Owing to the 
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representativeness heuristic, if sequences of good earnings news occur, investors fixate on this 
pattern and overreact. This combination of effects generates return momentum and reversal, 
and an overreaction/reversal pattern in response to trends in public value signals (e.g., earnings 
news sequences).  
Empirically, investors do naïvely extrapolate in experimental markets, survey, and field 
studies; and in various kinds of investments (e.g., Smith et al. (1988)). There is less support for 
overreaction to trends in public financial signals (Chan et al. (2004); Daniel & Titman (2006)). 
ii. Reinforcement learning 
Under reinforcement learning, an individual only extrapolates from his own direct 
experience, and without properly reflecting the informativeness of the data. There is financial 
evidence that investors learn to make financial decisions by naïve reinforcement.  Investors 
overextrapolate their own past performance in making investment choices (Choi et al. (2009); 
Chiang et al. (2011)). Furthermore, past life experiences also affect both investor and 
managerial decisions (Greenwood & Nagel (2009), Malmendier, Tate & Yan (2011)).   
iii. Inertia and habits 
People easily lock into habits, and rely on them with little thought. This leads to big 
mistakes when circumstances change. When there is memory loss about the reasons for past 
decisions, and if the environment is reasonably stable, it is, nevertheless, constrained-optimal 
to rely on habits (Hirshleifer & Welch (2002)). Action-induced attitude changes, as with 
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cognitive dissonance and the sunk cost fallacy, can also induce inertia. Empirically, retirement 
investors seldom update their portfolios as conditions change (Choi et al. (2004)).  
The status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser (1988)), a preference for the default 
choice among a set of options, also economizes on the reasoning system’s slow, effortful 
cognition. For example, defaults for pension plan contributions and allocations have large 
effects on investment decisions (e.g., Madrian & Shea (2001)).   
6. Feelings  
Feelings are a key source of the quick assessments provided by the intuitive system, and 
can overwhelm cooler analysis. For example, people who plan to consume sparingly are later 
tempted to consume heavily, resulting in time-inconsistent choices. This shows how immediacy 
can intensify the effects of feelings. People who foresee this can gain by imposing consumption 
rules upon themselves (Ainslie (1975)).   
Present-biased decision-making (quasi-hyperbolic discounting; Laibson (1997)) has been 
applied in models of savings, liquidity premia and the equity premium puzzle. To resolve the 
time-inconsistency of such preferences in favor of saving more, people impose personal rules 
such as consuming only out of interest and dividends, not principal (Thaler & Shefrin (1981)). 
This can explain the preference of investors for cash dividends (Shefrin & Statman (1984)).   
People often misattribute arousal and other transient feelings to other sources, biasing 
their judgments (Schwarz & Clore (1983)). Good mood increases optimism and risk-taking 
(Kuhnen  & Knutson (2011)). The kind of feeling matters, not just its valence.  For example, 
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when fearful, people tend to be more pessimistic and risk averse; when angry, more optimistic 
and risk tolerant (Lerner & Keltner (2001)). 
a. Familiarity and liking 
Exposure to an unreinforced stimulus tends to make people like it more, the mere 
exposure effect (Bornstein & D'Agostino (1992)). The evolutionary basis for this may be that 
what is familiar tends to be understood better, reducing risk; or that experience of a stimulus 
without adverse consequences indicates low risk. Indeed, familiarity reduces feelings of risk 
(Weber et al. (2005)). However, the familiarity heuristic can go astray, as when people prefer to 
bet on a matter about which they feel expert over another precisely equivalent gamble (Heath 
& Tversky (1991)). 
The endowment effect (Kahneman et al. (1990)) is a preference for retaining what one 
has over exchanging for a better alternative (as with refusing to swap a lottery ticket for an 
equivalent one plus cash).  A possible explanation is loss aversion. Alternatively, an already-
owned good may be affectively attractive by virtue of sense of ownership.  
  Ambiguity aversion is a distaste for layered gambles relative to single-stage gambles 
with identical payoff distributions (Ellsberg (1961); Bossaerts et al. (2010)). For example, 
investors may dislike uncertainty about the structure of a financial market, as distinguished 
from the effect of the future state realization given that structure.  
b. Financial theories based on feelings 
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Financial theorizing about feelings has been mostly informal (but see Mehra & Sah 
(2002)), which is surprising given their psychological importance.  A basic theme is that mood 
swings affect optimism, risk tolerance, and market prices. Owing to misattribution of transient 
mood to long-term prospects, mood swings associated with weather or sports events can affect 
prices (as documented by Saunders (1993); Hirshleifer & Shumway (2003); Edmans et al. 
(2007)). Seasonal shifts in length of day can induce Seasonal Affective Disorder, and are 
correlated with market returns (Kamstra et al. (2003)). 
Skepticism about the foreign and unfamiliar offers an explanation for the failure of 
investors to participate in important asset classes. Models of ambiguity aversion can help 
explain non-participation, familiarity bias, and their effects on asset pricing (Chen & Epstein 
(2002); Cao et al. (2011)). Such models potentially have an affective interpretation.  
Feelings of envy may help explain the attractiveness of investments with lottery payoffs, 
as individuals hear about high payoffs obtained by others. In the model of Goel & Thakor 
(2010), the takeovers decisions of managers are influenced by feelings of envy toward other 
managers, resulting in merger waves. 
c. Evidence on financial effects of familiarity and in-group bias 
People prefer local investments and familiar ones, such as firms that they are customers 
of (Grinblatt & Keloharju (2001); Huberman (2001)). One reason is that investors may have 
superior information about local or familiar firms (Coval & Moskowitz (1999)). However, this 
does not seem to be the only reason for local bias. For example, at the cost of poor 
diversification, employees invest in their own firms without showing signs of superior 
36 
 
information (Benartzi (2001)). Furthermore, informational superiority seems an unlikely 
explanation for home bias exhibited by great masses of unsophisticated investors.    
In-group bias (belief in the superior merits of one’s own group), which is relatively 
neglected in analytical modeling, implies bias in financial investing and economic exchange in 
favor of own-culture. Several studies provide supporting evidence (Grinblatt & Keloharju 
(2001)).   
Consistent with in-group bias and with theories based on aversion to uncertainty or 
unfamiliarity, distrust is an important barrier to participation in the stock market (Guiso et al. 
(2008)) and exchange and investment between countries (Guiso et al. (2009)). More generally, 
familiarity and in-group biases are sources of underdiversification, a problem to which 
unsophisticated investors are especially subject (Goetzmann & Kumar (2008)).  
d. Sentiment, shifting optimism and risk tolerance  
Investor sentiment is the fluctuating general attitude toward investment categories, 
such as growth stocks or long-term bonds. It can be associated with shifts in assessments of 
expected returns or of risk. Waves of irrational enthusiasm for, or abhorrence of, certain 
investment characteristics derive from shifts in the salience of emotional or cognitive triggers in 
the economic environment. Such shifts can be magnified by self-reinforcing social processes 
induced by media bias or conformity effects.    
In the model of DeLong et al. (1990a), irrational noise trading induces fluctuations in the 
price of an asset with riskfree dividends. Short horizons of rational risk averse investors prevent 
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full arbitrage between this asset and an asset with identical dividends that is not subject to 
noise trading. The theory implies that on average the speculative asset trades at a discount 
relative to fundamentals as compensation for its excess volatility. 
Lee et al. (1991) more broadly suggest that closed-end funds, like other small stocks, are 
subject to noise trading, so that irrational trading induces premia or discounts relative to the 
price of their underlying assets. Consistent with a risk discount for stochastic fund premia, on 
average funds trade at discounts relative to their holdings. Furthermore, discounts and premia 
comove across funds and with the returns on small stocks in general, which suggests a common 
influence of sentiment among naïve individual investors.     
If sentiment induces mispricing, then sentiment measures should predict future 
abnormal returns.  Empirically, U.S. closed end funds discounts and premia predict future small 
stock returns (Swaminathan (1996)). However, in distinguishing the pricing effects of sentiment 
from other hypotheses, it is useful to employ measures of sentiment that are not based on 
market prices (Qiu & Welch (2006)).  When several sentiment proxies are low, stocks that are 
hard to value and arbitrage earn high subsequent returns (Baker & Wurgler (2006)). High 
sentiment increases the profitability of the short legs but not the long legs of cross-sectional 
return anomalies (Stambaugh et al. (2012)). 
Measures of global sentiment negatively predict country-level returns. Both global and 
local sentiment are stronger return predictors for stocks that are hard to value and to arbitrage 
(Baker et al. (2012)).  
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Shifts in market sentiment create incentives for interested parties to incite misvaluation. 
In the theory of Baker & Wurgler (2004), managers cater to investor preferences for or against 
dividends. When the stock price premium on payers is high, firms start paying dividends in 
order to incite higher valuation. Consistent with this prediction, when sentiment favors 
dividends more, nonpayers tend to initiate dividends.    
7. Firm behavior: Exploiting versus inciting misvaluation 
A distinction that is fundamental for firm behavior in inefficient markets is between 
exploiting mispricing, defined as an action taken in response to a preexisting level of mispricing, 
and inciting, an action designed to shift the level of mispricing (Hirshleifer (2001)). Inciting takes 
advantage of the function describing the relation between market price and the firm’s action.1         
                                                             
1Inciting encompasses actions taken to shift mispricing either upward or downward. In contrast, 
“catering” (Baker & Wurgler (2012)) is defined as an action taken to increase price above 
fundamental value.  
Also, it is common to distinguish inciting or catering from timing, wherein the firm is 
sure to undertake the action, but uses discretion as to when. However, this is not an exhaustive 
partition of cases; a firm can exploit in its choice of whether rather than when to take an action. 
Post-event return drift is often interpreted as timing without consideration of this very 
plausible possibility. More importantly, the possibility of incitement of misvaluation is often 
ignored in favor of timing in response to preexisting misvaluation. 
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To illustrate this distinction, consider a firm that issues equity to exploit preexisting 
overvaluation. Owing to the negative average reaction to the announcement, there tends to be 
a reduction in overvaluation, but this will normally be an unavoidable adverse side-effect from 
the firm’s viewpoint, in which case this is not incitement. In contrast, a repurchase can be 
incitement if its purpose is to induce higher valuation (rather than merely distributing cash, or 
profiting from purchasing underpriced shares).  
Upward earnings management designed to induce overvaluation (or eliminate 
undervaluation) is also incitement. Most financial executives in one survey reported that they 
would sacrifice economic value in order to avoid missing quarterly earnings forecasts (Graham 
et al. (2005)). Similarly, managing earnings downward with the purpose of reducing the stock 
price (e.g., to persuade potential competitors that the business is unprofitable, or to reduce the 
cost of share repurchase), is downward incitement. Verbal communication can also be used to 
incite misvaluation, as with misleading disclosures, and discussions with media and analysts 
(typically upward “hype”). 
a. Theories of exploitive advisors and firms 
Section 5 points out that neglect of public signals results in return predictability based 
upon the accounting information, and therefore that manipulation of disclosures can incite 
over- or undervaluation (Hirshleifer & Teoh (2003); Hirshleifer et al. (2011)). 
Stein (1996) models the exploitation of exogenous stock market mispricing by firms in 
their financing and investment decisions. In Stein’s model, misvaluation affects real investment 
decisions more when managers have short time horizons, and firms should sometimes 
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paternalistically discount using beta even when beta is not a return predictor. In Daniel et al. 
(1998), new issues and repurchase amounts are selected by a firm as a function of mispricing to 
exploit investor overconfidence. This implies positive abnormal returns after repurchase and 
negative after new issues. 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006) model the exploitation of individual investor optimism in initial 
public offerings. Cornelli et al. (2006) provide evidence that institutional investors and 
underwriters exploit misvaluation of IPOs by individual investors.  
Investors with limited attention will sometimes overlook opportunism. One way to 
exploit customers is to add complexity; in the model of Carlin (2009), intentionally added 
complexity of financial products results in equilibrium price dispersion among competing 
providers.    
Exploitation and incitement can have adverse macroeconomic effects as well. In the 
theory of Gennaioli et al. (2012a), intermediaries design securities that seem nearly riskfree to 
take advantage of investor neglect of nonsalient risks. This results in booms and crashes.  
b. Evidence on exploitive advisors and firms 
Evidence suggests that investors are overly credulous about the strategic incentives of 
information sources, leaving them vulnerable to manipulation by firms, advisors, and 
intermediaries (such as analysts, brokers, and money managers). Daniel et al. (2002) argue that 
credulity derives from limited attention and overconfidence, and that it explains a wide range 
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of financial behaviors and pricing anomalies. Jensen (2005) argues, for example, that firm 
overvaluation promotes exploitive behavior on the part of managers. 
For example, evidence suggests that investors are naïve about strategic behavior by 
firms in their financial reporting. Issuers manage earnings upward at the time of IPO and 
seasoned issue; greater upward management is associated with worse post-event average 
abnormal returns (Teoh et al. (1998a,b)). This suggests that firms successfully incite 
overvaluation prior to issue, rather than just exploiting preexisting misvaluation.  
As mentioned earlier, analyst forecasts do not discount adequately for earnings 
management. Furthermore, evidence suggests that investors are naïve about analyst incentives 
to bias forecasts (Richardson et al. (2004)) and recommendations (Malmendier & Shanthikumar 
(2007)). Investors seem to be credulous about the strategic motives of managers in various 
other contexts as well, such as trusting that name changes are indicative of firm and fund 
policies (Cooper et al. (2005)), that fund marketing expenses are unimportant (Barber et al. 
(2005)), and that broker recommended funds are superior (Guercio & Reuter (2013)).   
The theoretical models of financing in inefficient markets discussed above predict 
abnormal returns after new issues and repurchase owing to firms selling their shares when 
overpriced and buying back when they are underpriced. Consistent with security issuance being 
associated with overvaluation, there is return continuation after new issues and repurchase 
(Section 4). In general, the occurrence of an event can predict subsequent abnormal returns 
either because of exploitation of existing mispricing, or because it incites mispricing. So post-
event abnormal return evidence does not, in itself, establish whether overvaluation causes 
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issuance, whether issuance causes overvaluation, or whether other actions associated with 
issuance cause overvaluation (e.g., earnings management inciting overvaluation at the time of 
issue).  These distinctions are often overlooked.  
c. Misvaluation, new issues and repurchase, and post-event returns   
Several studies point more specifically to exploitation of preexisting overpricing as part 
of the explanation. Surveys of U.S. CFOs find that misvaluation of their firms’ stocks is an 
important factor in deciding whether to issue equity, and that CFOs try to time interest rates in 
issuing debt (Graham & Harvey (2001)).  Furthermore, measures of prior misvaluation based 
upon the deviation of price from contemporaneous fundamentals are associated with 
subsequent new issuance of debt and especially equity, especially among overvalued firms 
(Dong et al. (2012)).    
Investment and growth-related measures are negative predictors of abnormal stock 
returns (Titman et al. (2004); Cooper et al. (2008); Polk & Sapienza (2009)). Such evidence does 
not resolve whether investment induces overvaluation (either as incitement, or as an 
unintended side-effect), or whether investment choices exploit preexisting misvaluation. 
Evidence that higher discretionary accruals is associated with greater investment is consistent 
with incitement. However, consistent with exploitation also playing a role, proxies for prior 
misvaluation predict investment (Gilchrist et al. (2005)). 
Misvaluation can also affect takeover behavior. In the model of Shleifer & Vishny (2003), 
overvalued bidders use equity and undervalued bidders pay cash. Potentially consistent with 
(but not proof of) misvaluation affecting takeover behavior, Loughran & Vijh (1997) find 
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negative post-event abnormal returns to stock acquirers. Proxies for misvaluation are also 
associated with the use of equity as payment, transaction characteristics, and market reactions 
to announcement in ways largely consistent with the Shleifer & Vishny (2003) model (Ang & 
Cheng (2006); Dong et al. (2006)); Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) also provide evidence of valuation 
(though not necessarily mispricing) effects.   
8. Conclusion: Behavioral finance and social finance   
I close with suggestions for future research. First, given the large grab bag of possible 
behavioral biases to choose from, building a financial model by just assuming some behavior 
that seems plausible, or even by invoking a documented psychological bias, is not always 
compelling. A healthy nascent trend in behavioral economics and finance has been to run 
laboratory and field experiments that closely match the decision environment assumed in the 
financial model. 
Second, the affective revolution in psychology of the 1990s, which elucidated the 
central role of feelings in decision-making, has only partially been incorporated into behavioral 
finance. More theoretical and empirical study is needed of how feelings affect financial 
decisions, and the implications of this for prices and real outcomes. This topic includes moral 
attitudes that infuse decisions about borrowing/saving, bearing risk, and exploiting other 
market participants.  
Third, behavioral finance should continue its evolution from broad descriptions of 
imperfect rationality and its consequences, such as noise trading or sentiment, toward analysis 
of particular psychological biases or categories of effects (e.g., overestimation of mean payoff, 
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underestimation of risk, or shifting risk preferences). Doing so will naturally draw more focused 
attention to specific pathways of causality, thereby helping to address endogeneity issues in 
some tests of the effects of sentiment or media.  
Most importantly, there is a need to move from behavioral finance to social finance 
(and social economics). Social finance includes the study of how social norms, moral attitudes, 
religions and ideologies affect financial behaviors (Hilary & Hui (2009), Hong et al. (2009), 
Kumar (2009), Kumar et al. (2011), Mcguire et al. (2012), Hong & Kostovetsky (2012), Hutton et 
al. (2013)), and how ideologies that affect financial decisions form and spread. This enterprise 
will draw on social psychology and sociology as well as cognitive psychology and decision 
theory, and will require focused attention to the microstructure of social transactions.  
Previous research has documented the spread of investment and managerial behaviors 
through observation of public behaviors or through social networks (see, e.g., the review of 
Hirshleifer & Teoh (2009b)). However, mere contagion is consistent with the spread of almost 
any behavior. To derive richer implications, it will be crucial to understand the transmission 
biases and amplification processes that make some investment ideas spread more easily than 
others. An initial set of leads is provided in the survey evidence and discussions of Robert Shiller 
(e.g., Shiller (2000)). Recent research has begun to model social transmission biases (Han & 
Hirshleifer (2014)) and test for their financial effects (Simon & Heimer (2012); Kaustia & 
Knüpfer (2012)).  
Analysis of social interactions promises to provide greater insight into where heuristics 
come from (since they are far from entirely innate), and to offer a foundation for understanding 
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shifts in investor sentiment. As such, it can potentially offer a deeper basis for understanding 
the causes and consequences of financial bubbles and crises. Even more fundamentally, 
understanding how financial ideas spread from person to person may eventually suggest 
theories of how investment and corporate ideologies, such as value versus growth philosophies, 
or the belief that indebtedness is bad, evolve.  
Behavioral finance has primarily focused on individual level biases. Social finance 
promises to offer equally fundamental insight, and to be a worthy descendant of behavioral 
finance.  
46 
 
References 
Ainslie G. 1975. Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control. 
Psychol. Bull. 82:463-96. 
Ang A, Hodrick RJ, Xing Y, Zhang X. 2006. The cross-section of volatility and expected returns. J. 
Finance. 61:259-99. 
Ang JS, Cheng Y. 2006. Direct evidence on the market-driven acquisitions theory. J. Finan. Res. 
29:199-216. 
Ashby FG, Maddox WT. 2005. Human category learning. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 56:149-78. 
Asness, CS, Moskowitz TJ, Pedersen LH. 2013. Value and momentum everywhere. J. Finance. 68: 
929-85. 
Baker M. 2009. Capital market-driven corporate finance. Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 1:181-205. 
Baker M, Pan X, Wurgler J. 2012. The effect of reference point prices on mergers and 
acquisitions. J. Finan. Econ. 106:49-71. 
Baker M, Wurgler J. 2000. The equity share in new issues and aggregate stock returns. J. 
Finance. 55:2219-57. 
Baker M, Wurgler J. 2004. A catering theory of dividends. J. Finance. 59:1125-65. 
Baker M, Wurgler J. 2006. Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns. J. Finance. 
61:1645-80. 
47 
 
Baker M, Wurgler J. 2012. Behavioral corporate finance: An updated survey. In Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, ed. GM Constantinides, M Harris, RM Stulz, Chapter 5, 2:357-424. New 
York, NY: Elsevier 
Baker M, Wurgler J, Yuan Y. 2012. Global, local, and contagious investor sentiment. J. Finan. 
Econ. 104:272-87. 
Barber B, Odean T. 2000. Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The common stock investment 
performance of individual investors. J. Finance. 55:773-806. 
Barber B, Odean T. 2002. Online investors: Do the slow die first? Rev. Finan. Stud. 15:455-88. 
Barber B, Odean T. 2008. All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the buying 
behavior of individual and institutional investors. Rev. Finan. Stud. 21:785-818. 
Barber B, Odean T, Zheng L. 2005. Out of sight, out of mind: The effects of expenses on mutual 
fund flows. J. Bus. 78:2095-119. 
Barberis N, Huang M. 2001. Mental accounting, loss aversion, and individual stock returns. J. 
Finance. 56:1247-92. 
Barberis N, Huang M. 2008. Stocks as lotteries: The implications of probability weighting for 
security prices. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95:2066-100. 
Barberis N, Shleifer A. 2003. Style investing. J. Finan. Econ. 68:161-99. 
Barberis N, Shleifer A, Vishny R. 1998. A model of investor sentiment. J. Finan. Econ. 49:307-43. 
Barberis N, Shleifer A, Wurgler J. 2005. Comovement. J. Finan. Econ. 75:283-317. 
48 
 
Barberis N, Thaler R. 2003. A survey of behavioral finance. In Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance, ed. G Constantinides, M Harris, R Stulz, Chapter 18, pp. 1053-123. Amsterdam: North-
Holland 
Barberis N, Xiong W. 2009. What drives the disposition effect? An analysis of a long-standing 
preference-based explanation. J. Finance. 64:751-84. 
Barberis N, Xiong W. 2012. Realization utility. J. Finan. Econ. 104:251-71. 
Ben-David I, Graham JR, Harvey CR. 2013. Managerial miscalibration. Quart. J. Econ.  128:1547-
84. 
Ben-David I, Hirshleifer D. 2012. Are investors really reluctant to realize their losses? Trading 
responses to past returns and the disposition effect. Rev. Finan. Stud. 25:2485-532. 
Benartzi S. 2001. Excessive extrapolation and the allocation of 401(k) accounts to company 
stock. J. Finance. 56:1747-64. 
Benartzi S, Thaler R. 1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Quart. J. Econ. 
110:75-92. 
Benoit JP, Dubra J, Moore DA. 2014. Does the better-than-average effect show that people are 
overconfident? Two experiments. J. Europ. Econ. Assoc., in press. 
Bernard VL, Thomas JK. 1989. Post-earnings-announcement drift: Delayed price response or risk 
premium? J. Acc. Res. Supplement 27:1-48. 
49 
 
Bernardo A, Welch I. 2001. On the evolution of overconfidence and entrepreneurs. J. Econ. 
Manage. Strategy. 10:301-30. 
Bernheim BD. 2009. On the potential of neuroeconomics: A critical (but hopeful) appraisal. Am. 
Econ. J: Microecon. 1:1-41. 
Beshears J, Choi JJ, Laibson D, Madrian BC. 2012. Does aggregated returns disclosure increase 
portfolio risk-taking? Work. Pap., Stanford Univ. 
Biais B, Hilton D, Mazurier K, Pouget S. 2005. Judgmental overconfidence, self-monitoring and 
trading performance in an experimental financial market. Rev. Econ. Stud. 72:287-312. 
Billett MT, Qian Y. 2008. Are overconfident CEOs born or made? Evidence of self-attribution 
bias from frequent acquirers. Manage. Sci. 54:1037-51. 
Bornstein R, D'Agostino P. 1992. Stimulus recognition and the mere exposure effect. J. Pers. Soc. 
Psychol. 63:545-52. 
Bossaerts P, Ghirardato P, Guarnaschelli S, Zame WR. 2010. Ambiguity in asset markets: Theory 
and experiment. Rev. Finan. Stud. 23:1325-59. 
Boyer B, Mitton T, Vorkink K. 2010. Expected idiosyncratic skewness. Rev. Finan. Stud. 23:169-
202.  
Burnside C, Han B, Hirshleifer D, Wang TY. 2011, Investor overconfidence and the forward 
premium puzzle. Rev. Econ. Stud. 78:523-58. 
50 
 
Camerer CF, Ho TH, Chong JK. 2004. A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Quart. J. Econ. 
119:861-98.  
Campbell TC, Gallmeyer M, Johnson SA, Rutherford J, Stanley BW. 2011. CEO optimism and 
forced turnover. J. Finan. Econ. 101:695-712. 
Cao HH, Han B, Hirshleifer D, Zhang HH. 2011. Fear of the unknown: Familiarity and economic 
decisions. Rev. Finance. 15:173-206. 
Card D, DellaVigna S, Malmendier U. 2011. The role of theory in field experiments. J. Econ. 
Perspect. 25:39-62. 
Carlin BI. 2009. Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets. J. Finan. Econ. 91:278-87. 
Chan LK, Lakonishok J, Sougiannis T. 2001. The stock market valuation of research and 
development expenditures. J. Finance. 56:2431-56. 
Chan WS, Frankel R, Kothari SP. 2004. Testing behavioral finance theories using trends and 
consistency in financial performance. J. Acc. Econ. 38:3-50. 
Chang T, Solomon DH, Westerfield MM. 2014. Looking for someone to blame: Delegation, 
cognitive dissonance, and the disposition effect. Work. Pap., Univ. Southern California. 
Chen Z, Epstein L. 2002. Ambiguity, risk and asset returns in continuous time. Econometrica. 
70:1403-43. 
Chiang YM, Hirshleifer D, Qian Y, Sherman AE. 2011. Do investors learn from experience? 
Evidence from frequent IPO investors. Rev. Finan. Stud. 24:1560-89. 
51 
 
Choi  JJ, Laibson D, Madrian BC, 2009. Mental Accounting in Portfolio Choice: Evidence from a 
Flypaper Effect, Am. Econ. Rev., 99:2085-2095. 
Choi  JJ, Laibson D, Madrian BC,  Metrick A. 2004. For better or for worse: Default effects and 
401(k) savings behavior. In Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, ed. DA Wise, pp. 81-121. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 
Choi JJ, Laibson D, Madrian BC, Metrick A. 2009. Reinforcement learning and savings behavior. J. 
Finance. 64:2515-34. 
Cohen L, Lou D. 2012. Complicated firms. J. Finan. Econ. 104:383-400. 
Cooper MJ, Gulen H, Rau PR. 2005. Changing names with style: Mutual fund name changes and 
their effects on fund flows. J. Finance. 60:2825-58. 
Cooper MJ, Gulen H, and Schill MJ. 2008. Asset growth and the cross-section of stock returns. J. 
Finance. 63:1609-51. 
Cornelli F, Goldreich D, Ljungqvist A. 2006. Investor sentiment and pre-IPO markets. J. Finance. 
61:1187-216. 
Cosmides L, Tooby J. 2013. Evolutionary psychology: New perspectives on cognition and 
motivation. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 64:201-29. 
Coval JD, Moskowitz TJ. 1999. Home bias at home: Local equity preference in domestic 
portfolios. J. Finance. 54:2045-73. 
Coval JD, Shumway T. 2005. Do behavioral biases affect prices? J. Finance. 60:1-34. 
52 
 
Coval JD, Thakor AV. 2008. Financial intermediation as a beliefs-bridge between optimists and 
pessimists. J. Finan. Econ. 75:535-69. 
Daniel KD, Hirshleifer D, Subrahmanyam A. 1998. Investor psychology and security market 
under- and over-reactions. J. Finance. 53:1839-86. 
Daniel KD, Hirshleifer D, Subrahmanyam A. 2001. Overconfidence, arbitrage, and equilibrium 
asset pricing. J. Finance. 56:921-65. 
Daniel KD, Hirshleifer D, Teoh SH. 2002. Investor psychology in capital markets:  Evidence and 
policy implications. J. Monet. Econ. 49:139-209. 
Daniel KD, Titman S. 2006. Market reactions to tangible and intangible information. J. Finance. 
61:1605-43. 
De Bondt W, Thaler R. 1985. Does the stock market overreact? J. Finance. 40:793-808. 
DeGeorge F, Patel J, Zeckhauser R. 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. J. Bus. 
72:1-34. 
DellaVigna S, Pollet J. 2009. Investor inattention and Friday earnings announcements. J. Finance. 
64:709-49. 
DellaVigna S, Pollet JM. 2007. Demographics and industry returns. Amer. Econ. Rev. 97:1667-
702. 
DeLong JB, Shleifer A, Summers L, Waldmann RJ. 1990a. Noise trader risk in financial markets. J. 
Polit. Economy. 98:703-38. 
53 
 
DeLong  JB, Shleifer A, Summers L, Waldmann RJ. 1990b. Positive feedback investment 
strategies and destabilizing rational speculation. J. Finance. 45:375-95. 
DeLong JB, Shleifer A, Summers L, Waldmann RJ. 1991. The survival of noise traders in financial 
markets. J. Bus. 64:1-20. 
Diether, KB, Malloy CJ, Scherbina A. 2002. Differences of opinion and the cross section of stock 
returns. J. Finance. 57:2113-41. 
Dong M, Hirshleifer D, Richardson S, Teoh SH. 2006. Does investor misvaluation drive the 
takeover market? J. Finance. 61:725-62. 
Dong M, Hirshleifer D, Teoh SH. 2012. Overvalued equity and financing decisions. Rev. Finan. 
Stud. 25:3645-83. 
Dougal C, Engelberg J, Parsons C, Wesep EV. 2014. Anchoring on credit spreads. J. Finance. In 
press. 
Edmans A, García D, Norli Ø. 2007. Sports sentiment and stock returns. J. Finance. 62:1967-98. 
Edwards W. 1968. Conservatism in human information processing. In Formal Representation of 
Human Judgment, ed. B Kleinmuntz, pp. 17-52. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons 
Ellsberg D. 1961. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quart. J. Econ. 75:643-99. 
Eraker B, Ready MJ. 2014. Do investors overpay for stocks with lottery-like payoffs? An 
examination of the returns on OTC stocks. J. Finan. Econ. In press. 
Eyster E, Rabin M. 2005. Cursed equilibrium. Econometrica. 73:1623-72. 
54 
 
Fama EF, French KR. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. J. Finan. 
Econ. 33:3-56. 
Festinger L, Carlsmith JM. 1959. Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. J. Abnorm. Soc. 
Psych. 58:203-11. 
Fisher I. 1928. The Money Illusion. New York, NY: Adelphi Company 
Foster G, Olsen C, Shevlin T. 1984. Earnings releases, anomalies, and the behavior of security 
returns. Acc. Rev. 59:574-603. 
Frazzini A, Pedersen LH. 2014. Betting against beta. J. Finan. Econ. 111:1-25. 
French KR, Poterba JM. 1991. Investor diversification and international equity markets. Amer. 
Econ. Rev. 81:222-6. 
Frydman C, Barberis N, Camerer C, Bossaerts P, Rangel A. 2014. Using neural data to test a 
theory of investor behavior: An application to realization utility. J. Finance. 69:907-946 
Gal D. 2006. A psychological law of inertia and the illusion of loss aversion. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 
1:23-32. 
Gennaioli N, Shleifer A, Vishny R. 2012a. Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial 
fragility. J. Finan. Econ. 104:452-68. 
Gennaioli N, Shleifer A, Vishny R. 2014. Money doctors. Work. Pap., Harvard Univ. 
George T, Hwang CY. 2004. The 52-week high and momentum investing. J. Finance. 59:2145-76. 
55 
 
Gervais S, Kaniel R, Mingelgrin D. 2001. The high-volume return premium. J. Finance. 56:877-
919. 
Gervais S, Odean T. 2001. Learning to be overconfident. Rev. Finan. Stud. 14:1-27. 
Gigerenzer G, Hoffrage U. 1995. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: 
Frequency formats. Psychol. Rev. 102:684-704. 
Gilchrist S, Himmelberg CP, Huberman G. 2005. Do stock price bubbles influence corporate 
investment? J. Monet. Econ. 52:805-27. 
Goel AM, Thakor AV. 2008. Overconfidence, CEO selection, and corporate governance. J. 
Finance. 63:2737-84. 
Goel AM, Thakor AV. 2010. Do Envious CEOs Cause Merger Waves? Rev. Finan. Stud. 23: 487-
517. 
Goetzmann WN, Kumar A. 2008. Equity portfolio diversification. Rev. Finance. 12:433-63. 
Graham JR, Harvey C, Rajgopal S. 2005. The economic implications of corporate financial 
reporting. J. Acc. Econ. 40:3-73. 
Graham JR, Harvey CR. 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the 
field. J. Finan. Econ. 60:187-243. 
Graham JR, Harvey CR, Huang H. 2009. Investor competence, trading frequency, and home bias. 
Manage. Sci. 55:1094-106. 
56 
 
Graham JR, Harvey CR, Puri M. 2013. Managerial attitudes and corporate actions. J. Finan. Econ. 
109:103-21. 
Greenwood R, Nagel S. 2009. Inexperienced investors and bubbles. J. Finan. Econ. 93:239-58. 
Griffin JM, Ji S, Martin JS. 2003. Momentum investing and business cycle risk: Evidence from 
pole to pole. J. Finance. 58:2515-47. 
Griffin JM, Nardari F, Stulz RM. 2007. Do investors trade more when stocks have performed 
well? Evidence from 46 countries. Rev. Finan. Stud. 20:905-51. 
Grinblatt M, Han B. 2005. Prospect theory, mental accounting, and momentum. J. Finan. Econ. 
78:311-39. 
Grinblatt M, Keloharju M. 2001. How distance, language and culture influence stockholdings 
and trades. J. Finance. 56:1053-73. 
Grinblatt M, Keloharju M, Linnainmaa JT. 2011. IQ and stock market participation. J. Finance. 
66:2121-64. 
Gromb D, Vayanos D. 2010. Limits of arbitrage. Annu. Rev. Financ. Econ. 2:251-75. 
Guercio DD, Reuter J. 2014. Mutual fund performance and the incentive to generate alpha. J. 
Finance. 69:1673–704. 
Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L. 2008. Trusting the stock market. J. Finance. 63:2557-600. 
Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L. 2009. Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?, Quart. J. of Econ., 
124:1095-1131. 
57 
 
Haidt, J and Kesebir, S. 2010. Morality. Handbook of Soc. Psych. Wiley, Hoboken NJ. 5th ed. Fiske, 
ST, Gilbert  DT, Lindzey G eds. 
Han B, Hirshleifer D. 2014. Self-enhancing transmission bias and active investing. Work. Pap., 
Univ. Texas at Austin.  
Harris L, Gurel E. 1986. Price and volume effects associated with changes in the S&P 500 list: 
New evidence for the existence of price pressures. J. Finance. 41:815-829. 
Haselton MG, Nettle D. 2006. The paranoid optimist: An integrative evolutionary model of 
cognitive biases. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 10:47-66. 
Heath C, Tversky A. 1991. Preferences and beliefs: Ambiguity and competence in choice under 
uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertaint. 4:5-28. 
Henderson BJ, Jegadeesh N, Weisbach MS. 2006. World markets for raising new capital. J. Finan. 
Econ. 82:63-101. 
Henderson V. 2012. Prospect theory, liquidation, and the disposition effect. Manage. Sci. 
58:445-60. 
Hilary G, Hsu C. 2011. Endogenous overconfidence in managerial forecasts. J. Acc. Econ. 51: 
300-13. 
Hilary G, Hui KW (2009). Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America? J. Fin. 
Econ., 93: 455-73. 
Hirshleifer D. 2001. Investor psychology and asset pricing. J. Finance. 64:1533-97. 
58 
 
Hirshleifer D. 2008. Psychological bias as a driver of financial regulation. Europ. Finan. Manage. 
14:856-74. 
Hirshleifer D, Hou K, Teoh SH. 2012. The accrual anomaly: Risk or mispricing? Manage. Sci. 
58:320-35. 
Hirshleifer D, Hou K, Teoh SH, Zhang Y. 2004. Do investors overvalue firms with bloated balance 
sheets? J. Acc. Econ. 38:297-331. 
Hirshleifer D, Jiang D. 2010. A financing-based misvaluation factor and the cross section of 
expected returns. Rev. Finan. Stud. 23:3401-36. 
Hirshleifer D, Lim SS, Teoh SH. 2009. Driven to distraction: Extraneous events and 
underreaction to earnings news. J. Finance. 64:2289-325. 
Hirshleifer D, Lim SS, Teoh SH. 2011. Limited investor attention and stock market misreactions 
to accounting information. Rev. Asset Pricing Stud. 1:35-73. 
Hirshleifer D, Shumway T. 2003. Good day sunshine: Stock returns and the weather. J. Finance. 
58:1009-32. 
Hirshleifer D, Subrahmanyam A, Titman S. 2006. Feedback and the success of irrational traders. 
J. Finan. Econ. 81:311-38. 
Hirshleifer D, Teoh SH. 2003. Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting. 
J. Acc. Econ. 36:337-86. 
59 
 
Hirshleifer D, Teoh SH. 2009a. The psychological attraction approach to accounting and 
disclosure policy. Contemp. Account. Res. 26:1067-90. 
Hirshleifer D, Teoh SH. 2009b. Thought and behavior contagion in capital markets. In Handbook 
of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution, ed. T Hens, K Schenk-Hoppe, Chapter 1, pp. 1-46. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Hirshleifer D, Teoh SH, Yu JJ. 2011. Short arbitrage, return asymmetry and the accrual anomaly. 
Rev. Finan. Stud. 24:2429-61. 
Hirshleifer D, Welch I. 2002. An economic approach to the psychology of change: Amnesia, 
inertia, and impulsiveness. J. Econ. Manage. Strategy. 11:379-421. 
Hirshleifer D, Low A, Teoh SH. 2012. Are overconfident CEOs better innovators? J. Finance. 
67:1457-98. 
Hong H, Kacperczyk M. 2009. The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on Markets, J. Finan. 
Econ., 93:15-36. 
Hong H, Lim T, Stein J. 2000. Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage and the profitability 
of momentum strategies. J. Finance. 55:265-95. 
Hong H, Stein J. 1999. A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading and overreaction 
in asset markets. J. Finance. 54:2143-84. 
Hong H, Scheinkman JA, Xiong W. 2006. Asset float and speculative bubbles. J. Finance. 
61:1073-117. 
60 
 
Huberman G. 2001. Familiarity breeds investment. Rev. Finan. Stud. 14:659-80. 
Huberman G, Regev T. 2001. Contagious speculation and a cure for cancer. J. Finance. 56:387-
96. 
Ikenberry D, Lakonishok J, Vermaelen T. 1995. Market underreaction to open market share 
repurchases. J. Finan. Econ. 39:181-208. 
Ingersoll JE, Jin LJ. 2013. Realization Utility with Reference-Dependent Preferences. Rev. Finan. 
Stud. Forthcoming.  
Jegadeesh N, Titman S. 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for 
stock market efficiency. J. Finance. 48:65-91. 
Jegadeesh N, Titman S. 2011. Momentum. Work. Pap., Emory Univ. 
Jensen MC. 2005. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Finan. Manage. 34:5-19. 
Jiang D, Kumar A, Law K. 2014. Political contributions and analyst behavior. Work. Pap., Florida 
State Univ. 
Jiang G, Lee C, Zhang Y. 2005. Information uncertainty and expected returns. Rev. Acc. Stud. 
10:185-221. 
Kahneman D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 
Kahneman D, Frederick S. 2002. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive 
judgment. In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. T Gilovich, D 
Griffin, D Kahneman, pp. 49-81. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 
61 
 
Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler R. 1990. Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the 
Coase theorem. J. Polit. Economy. 98:1325-48. 
Kahneman D, Lovallo D. 1993. Timid choices and bold forecasts: A cognitive perspective on risk 
taking. Manage. Sci. 39:17-31. 
Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tversky A. 1982. Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 
Kahneman D, Tversky A. 1973. On the psychology of prediction. Psychol. Rev. 80:237-5l. 
Kahneman D, Tversky A. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica. 
47:263-91. 
Kaustia M, Knüpfer S. 2012. Peer performance and stock market entry. J. Finan. Econ. 104:321-
38. 
Klibanoff P, Lamont O, Wizman TA. 1998. Investor reaction to salient news in closed-end 
country funds. J. Finance. 53:673-99. 
Kumar A, Lee C. 2006. Retail investor sentiment and return comovements. J. Finance. 61:2451-
86. 
Kumar A. 2009. Who Gambles in the Stock Market? J. Finance. 64:1889-933 
Kumar A, Page JK Oliver G. Spalt OG. 2011. Religious Beliefs, Gambling Attitudes and Financial 
Market Outcomes, J. Finan. Econ. 102: 671-708.  
62 
 
Mcguire ST, Omer TC, Sharp, NY. 2012. The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting 
Irregularities, Accounting Rev., 87:645-73. 
Hong H, Kostovetsky L. 2012. Red and Blue Investing: Values and Finance, J. Finan. Econ. 103:1-
19. 
Hutton, I, Jiang, D, Kumar A. 2013. Corporate Policies of Republican Managers. J. Financ. & 
Quant. Anal., forthcoming. 
Kamstra, M, Kramer, L, Levi, M. 2000. Winter Blues: A SAD Stock Market Cycle, Am. Econ. Rev., 
93:324-343 
Kuhnen, CM, Knutson, B. 2011. The Influence of Affect on Beliefs, Preferences and Financial 
Decisions, J. Fin. & Quant. Anal., 46:605-26. 
Laibson D. 1997. Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quart. J. Econ. 112:443-77. 
Lakonishok, J, Shleifer,  A, Vishny, R. 1994. Contrarian investment, extrapolation and risk, J. 
Finance. 49:1541-78. 
Lamont O, Thaler R. 2003. Can the market add and subtract? Mispricing in tech stock carve-outs. 
J. Polit. Economy. 111:227-68. 
Langer EJ, Roth J. 1975. Heads I win, tails it’s chance: The illusion of control as a function of the 
sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 32:951-5. 
Lee C, Shleifer A, Thaler R. 1991. Investor sentiment and the closed-end fund puzzle. J. Finance. 
46:75-109. 
63 
 
Lerner JS, Keltner D. 2001. Fear, anger, and risk. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 81:146-59. 
Li Y, Yang L. 2013. Prospect theory, the disposition effect, and asset prices. J. Finan. Econ. 
107:715-39. 
Libby R, Bloomfield R, Nelson MW. 2002. Experimental research in financial accounting. 
Account. Org. Soc. 27:775-810. 
Lim SS. 2006. Do investors integrate losses and segregate gains? Mental accounting and 
investor trading decisions. J. Bus. 79:2539-73. 
Ljungqvist A, Nanda V, Singh R. 2006. Hot markets, investor sentiment, and IPO pricing. J. Bus. 
79:1667-702. 
Loughran T, Ritter J. 1995. The new issues puzzle. J. Finance. 50:23-52. 
Loughran T, Vijh AM. 1997. Do long-term shareholders benefit from corporate acquisitions? J. 
Finance. 52:1765-90. 
Lusardi A, Mitchell OS. 2011. Financial literacy around the world: An overview. J. Pension Econ. 
Finance. 10:497-508. 
Madrian B, Shea D. 2001. The power of suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) participation and savings 
behavior. Quart. J. Econ. 116:1149-87. 
Malmendier U, Shanthikumar D. 2007. Are small investors naive about incentives? J. Finan. 
Econ. 85:457-89. 
64 
 
Malmendier U, Tate G. 2008. Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's 
reaction. J. Finan. Econ. 89:20-43. 
Malmendier U, Tate G. 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. J. Finance. 
60:2661-700. 
Malmendier U, Tate G, Yan J. 2011. Overconfidence and early-life experiences: The effect of 
managerial traits on corporate financial policies. J. Finance. 66:1687-733. 
Mehra, R, Prescott E. 1985. The Equity Premium: A Puzzle. J. Mon. Econ.  15:145-61. 
Mehra R, Sah R. 2002. Mood fluctuations, projection bias, and volatility of equity prices. J. Econ. 
Dynam. Control. 26:869-87. 
Merkle C, Weber M. 2011. True overconfidence: The inability of rational information processing 
to account for apparent overconfidence. Org. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 116:262-71. 
Miller E. 1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. J. Finance. 32:1151-68. 
Moskowitz TJ, Ooi YH, Pedersen LH. 2012. Time series momentum. J. Finan. Econ. 104:228-50. 
Nagel S. 2005. Short sales, institutional investors and the cross-section of stock returns. J. Finan. 
Econ. 78:277-309. 
Nisbett RE, Wilson TD. 1977. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental 
processes. Psychol. Rev. 84:231-59. 
Odean T. 1998. Volume, volatility, price and profit when all traders are above average. J. 
Finance. 53:1887-934. 
65 
 
Peng L, Xiong W. 2006. Investor attention, overconfidence and category learning. J. Finan. Econ. 
80:563-602. 
Polk C, Sapienza P. 2009. The stock market and corporate investment: A test of catering theory. 
Rev. Finan. Stud. 22:187-217. 
Puri M, Robinson DT. 2007. Optimism and economic choice. J. Finan. Econ. 86:71-99. 
Qiu X, Welch I. 2006. Investor sentiment measures. Work. Pap., Brown Univ. 
Rabin M. 2000. Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. Econometrica. 
68:1281-92. 
Rashes MS. 2001. Massively confused investors making conspicuously ignorant choices (MCI - 
MCIC). J. Finance. 56:1911-27. 
Rhodes-Kropf M, Robinson DT, Viswanathan S. 2005. Valuation waves and merger activity: The 
empirical evidence. J. Finan. Econ. 77:561-603. 
Richardson S, Teoh SH, Wysocki PD. 2004. The walk-down to beatable analyst forecasts: The 
role of equity issuance and insider trading incentives. Contemp. Account. Res. 21:885-924. 
Ritter JR, Warr RS. 2002. The decline of inflation and the bull market of 1982 to 1999. J. Finan. 
Quant. Anal. 37:29-61. 
Samuelson W, Zeckhauser R. 1988. Status-quo bias in decision making. J. Risk Uncertaint. 1:7-59. 
Saunders EM, Jr.1993. Stock prices and Wall Street weather. Amer. Econ. Rev. 83:1337-45. 
66 
 
Schwarz N, Clore GL. 1983. Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and 
directive functions of affective states. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 45:513-23. 
Shefrin H, Statman M. 1984. Explaining investor preference for cash dividends. J. Finan. Econ. 
13:253-82. 
Shefrin H, Statman M. 1985. The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: 
Theory and evidence. J. Finance. 40:777-90. 
Shiller RJ. 1999. Human behavior and the efficiency of the financial system. In Handbook of 
Macroeconomics, Volume 1, ed. JB Taylor, M Woodford. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Shiller RJ. 2000. Irrational exuberance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
Shleifer A. 1986. Do demand curves for stocks slope down? J. Finance. 41:579-90. 
Shleifer A. 2000. Inefficient markets: An introduction to behavioral finance. Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press 
Shleifer A, Vishny R. 1997. The limits to arbitrage. J. Finance. 52:35-55. 
Shleifer A, Vishny R. 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. J. Finan. Econ. 70:295-311. 
Simon D, Heimer R. 2012. Facebook finance: How social interaction propagates active investing. 
Work. Pap., Brandeis Univ. 
Simon HA. 1956. Rational choice and the structure of environments. Psychol. Rev. 63:129-38. 
67 
 
Sloan R. 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future 
earnings? Acc. Rev. 71:289-315. 
Slovic P, Finucan M, Peters E, MacGregor DG. 2002. The affect heuristic. In Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. T Gilovich, D Griffin, D Kahneman. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press 
Smith VL. 2008. Experimental economics. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd 
edition), ed. SN Durlauf, LE Blume. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 
Smith VL, Suchanek GL, Williams AW. 1988. Bubbles, crashes and endogenous expectations in 
experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica. 56:1119-51. 
Spiess DK, Affleck-Graves J. 1995. Underperformance in long-run stock returns following 
seasoned equity offerings. J. Finan. Econ. 38:243-68. 
Stanovich KE. 1999. Who Is Rational?: Studies of individual Differences in Reasoning. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Statman M, Thorley S, Vorkink K. 2006. Investor overconfidence and trading volume. Rev. Finan. 
Stud. 19:1531-65. 
Staw BM. 1976. Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a chosen 
course of action. Org. Behav. Hum. Perform. 16:27-44. 
Stein J. 1996. Rational capital budgeting in an irrational world. J. Bus. 69:429-55. 
68 
 
Swaminathan B. 1996. Time-varying expected small firm returns and closed-end fund discounts. 
Rev. Finan. Stud. 9:845-88. 
Teoh SH, Welch I, Wong TJ. 1998a. Earnings management and the long-term market 
performance of initial public offerings. J. Finance. 53:1935-74. 
Teoh SH, Welch I, Wong TJ. 1998b. Earnings management and the underperformance of 
seasoned equity offerings. J. Finan. Econ. 50:63-99. 
Teoh SH, Wong TJ. 2002. Why do new issues and high accrual firms underperform? The role of 
analysts’ credulity. Rev. Finan. Stud. 15:869-900. 
Tesar LL, Werner IM. 1995. Home bias and high turnover. J. Int. Money Finance. 14:467-92. 
Thaler R. 1980. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 1:39-60. 
Thaler R, Shefrin HM. 1981. An economic theory of self-control. J. Polit. Economy. 89:392-406. 
Thaler R, Sunstein CR. 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
Titman S, Wei JK, Xie F. 2004. Capital investment and stock returns. J. Finan. Quant. Anal. 
39:677-701. 
Trivers R. 1991. Deceit and self-deception. In Man and Beast Revisited, ed. MH Robinson, L 
Tiger. Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Press 
Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1971. Belief in the law of small numbers. Psychol. Bull. 76:105-10. 
69 
 
Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science. 
211:453-8. 
Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1992. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of 
uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertaint. 5:297-323. 
Weber EU, Siebenmorgen N, Weber M. 2005. Communicating asset risk: How name recognition 
and the format of historic volatility information affect risk perception and investment decisions. 
Risk Anal. 25:597-609. 
Weinstein ND. 1980. Unrealistic optimism about future life events. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 39:806-
20. 
Welch I, Levi Y. 2013. Long-term asset-class based capital budgeting. Work. Pap., UCLA. 
Xiong W, Yu J. 2011. The Chinese warrants bubble. Amer. Econ. Rev. 101:2723-53. 
Yan H. 2008. Natural selection in financial markets: Does it work? Manage. Sci. 54:1935-50. 
